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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

20 September 1949

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANIAM NO. 225

SUBJECT: ESTIMATE OF STATUS OF ATONIC WARFARE IN THE USSR (Category No. 5)

Category as a whole:

The USSR has an atomic energy program which started in late 1945 and which is being vigorously oursed under a top priority. The current estimate of the Joint Buclear Energy Intelligence Committee is that the earliest possible date by which the USSR might be expected to produce an atomic bomb is mid-1950 and the most probable date is mid-1953.

ESTIMATE BY TECHNICAL OBJECTIVES

AW-1.

He foreign country is known to be developing a large-scale uranium isotope-separation program, although a number of countries are planning to develop plutonium production facilities. It is believed, that excluding Britain, the USSR, and possibly Canada, no foreign country has the capability of producing sufficient fissionable material to make an atomic bomb within the next ten years.

Present information indicates that a plutonium project for the production of fissionable materials is being developed. It is reasonable to suppose that the Soviets have had at least one low-energy pile (probably graphite) operating for a year or more although no incontrovertible evidence exists. It is probable that production piles are now in the

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No Change In Class.
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process of design and/or construction, but their exact status is unknown. There is no evidence of a large-scale uranium isotops separation project.

AY-2

There is no information indicating that any foreign country is engaged in a project dealing with radiological warfare agents.

AK -3

As the production of radiological warfare agents requires operating production piles, it is apparent that no foreign country can have
done very much in this field.

No information is available.

AV-5

Defensive measures against radiological warfare agents have not been apparent within the USSR. The single possible exception is a report that a large portion of the counters being manufactured by one German plant for the USSR is numered to be for distribution to the Red Army down to the company level. Large production of field counters for the Soviets has been reported in Germany and elsewhere; but, as far as can be determined, these are primarily for use in the uranium mining operations. Although protective measures for the general public may be in the planning stage, it is difficult to believe that widespread education programs would escape detection.

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AV-6

No information is available.

